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CASENOTE; In re Petition to Transfer Territory from Vaughn School
District to Power School District: Leaning Heavily on the Principle of
Substance over Form
Luc Brodhead
As the final authority for interpreting Montana statutes, the
Montana Supreme Court cannot make its interpretations lightly. To guide
its hand, the Court relies on the principles of statutory interpretation and
the codified notion that the “law respects form less than substance.”1 This
principle enables the Court to excuse technical deficiencies in the name of
judicial efficiency and justice when it determines that the deficiency does
not implicate the substance of the statute.
In In Re Petition to Transfer Territory From Vaughn Elementary
School District to Power Elementary School District2, the Court invoked
this principle to support its conclusion that a new elementary school had
met the statutory opening requirements. The Court had to reach that
conclusion to protect the school from a land grab by a neighboring school
district. While the Court had good intentions, its reasoning did not fully
support the conclusion that the elementary school met each requirement.
Rather, the Court leaned heavily on the principle of substance over form
to excuse deficiencies that stood in the way of a just result. Consequently,
the Court turned a carefully applied judicial gloss into a powerful trump
card: a simple phrase the Court can invoke when it wants to overlook the
express words of the Legislature.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2013, several members of the Hillcrest Hutterite
Colony petitioned the Vaughn School District Board of Trustees to open a
public elementary school in one of the colony facilities.3 The School
District agreed to provide a full-time teacher, a teacher’s aid, teaching
supplies, textbooks, and administrative support.4 The school, named the
Hillcrest Attendance Center (Attendance Center), began welcoming
students late summer of 2013.5
In November of 2013, Vaughn School District received a petition
from Power School District to transfer a specific portion of its territory
pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 20–6–105.6 Under that provision, the local
electorate can petition to transfer territory among school districts as long

1

MONT. CODE ANN. § 1–3–219 (2015).
In Re Petition to Transfer Territory From Vaughn Elementary School Dist. to Power Elementary
School Dist., 360 P.3d 1119 (Mont. 2015).
3
Id. at 1120.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
2

2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 77

as the statutory criteria for the territory are met.7 One such requirement is
that the “territory to be transferred is not located within 3 miles, over the
shortest practicable route, of an operating school in the district from which
it is to be transferred.”8
A panel of county superintendents was assembled to address the
petition. Citing the above provision, the panel dismissed the transfer
request because the Hillcrest Attendance Center was located within 3
miles of the territory.9 The commissioners concluded that the Attendance
Center is a school under the statutory definition and “operates as any
public school in the state of Montana.”10
Power School District sought judicial review of the decision on
the issue of whether the Attendance Center constituted a school for the
purpose of limiting territory transfers.11 The district court affirmed,
holding that “[i]n all respects, [the Attendance Center] is an operating
school maintained under state law at public expense.”12 Power School
District appealed the district court’s decision.13
II. MAJORITY HOLDING
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the district court’s
decision, holding that the Attendance center was a school under the
statutory definition and thus affirmed the dismissal of the transfer
request.14 To support its decision, the Court interpreted the statutory
definition of an “operating school” under § 20–6–501 and found that, in
substance, the Attendance Center met the standard despite statutory
deficiencies in how the school was established.15
The Court acknowledged the statutory definition of a school as
being “an institution for the teaching of children that is established and
maintained under the laws of the state of Montana.”16 Having done so, it
readily concluded that the Attendance Center met the requirement of being
“an institution for the teaching of children,” pointing out that, under the
agreement between Vaughn School District and the Hillcrest Colony, the
Attendance Center would operate as a public school of the Vaughn School
District, it would be provided with teachers and supplies, and it was
required to meet all school district, state, and federal laws.17
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The Court also addressed whether the Attendance Center met the
requirement of being “established and maintained” under Montana law.18
It did so in response to Power School District’s argument that the
Attendance Center “was not opened consistent with the procedures set
forth in § 20–6–502,” specifically that the opening lacked approval from
the county commissioners.19 Reviewing the argument, the Court
acknowledged that § 20–6–502 provides that a petition to open an
elementary school must be presented “to the board of county
commissioners for their consideration,” and that “the board may approve
or disapprove the requested opening.”20 The Court acknowledged that the
Vaughn School District Trustees somehow missed this step before
opening the Attendance Center.21 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that
the school still was “established . . . under the laws of the state of
Montana.”22
To reach this conclusion, the Court invoked the principle of
substance over form and held that, in substance, the school met the
“established” element of the statutory definition.23 Despite lacking
approval from the county commissioners, the school was still approved by
“local school authorities,” and the facts of the case satisfied the substance
of what it means to be “established . . . under the laws of the state of
Montana.”24 The Court’s final conclusion articulated that to hold
otherwise would “truly elevate form over substance.”25
III. JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT
Justice McKinnon dissented from the Court’s opinion, asserting
that the Attendance Center should not have been considered a school and
thus should not be funded, accredited, or protected from the land transfer.26
She focused on how the Legislature “specifically provided” for a county
commissioner’s approval before an elementary school can be opened, and
she argued that to ignore this requirement would “be tantamount to
disregarding the plain language of the statutory scheme and omitting
language that the Legislature inserted.”27
She further justified her position, asserting that, not only did the
Legislature unambiguously include the requirement, but that it had
significant policy justification for doing so.28 She reasoned that it is the
18
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county commissioners who actually levy the required taxes to fund the
opening of a new school and that they are the ones accountable to the
taxpayers for the subsequent tax increases.29 She also pointed out that “the
statutory scheme allows the county commissioners one substantive
opportunity to exercise their power over the funding of a new school . . .
and this comes at the time the school is established pursuant to § 20–6–
502.”30
McKinnon concluded that the Court overstepped its function by
“fundamentally alter[ing]” the Legislature’s design for establishing
schools, and she made the prediction that “local school trustees may now
sidestep elected officials” during that process.31 She characterized the
Court’s decision as “divest[ing] elected officials of power that has been
properly granted to them by the Legislature.”32
IV. ANALYSIS
McKinnon’s dissent explained the legal and policy reasons why
school districts need to get approval from county commissioners before
opening new schools. In doing so, she demonstrated the significance of the
commissioner approval requirement to the overall scheme of regulating
and funding of schools in Montana. Considering the significance of the
commissioner approval requirement, it is concerning that the Court relied
so heavily on the principle of substance over form to justify its decision.
If the Court believes that enforcing an unambiguous and significant
procedural step is to “elevate form over substance,” then what other
statutory requirements will the Court overlook down the road?33
This analysis will address how the Court has applied the principle
of substance over form in the past and how, in this case, the Court
broadened the circumstances where it can gloss over statutory
requirements without legitimate justification.
A. The Court Previously Applied the Concept of Substance over Form to
Excuse Minor Statutory Deficiencies, but Limited Its Application to
Those Deficiencies Determined Nonessential to the Substance of the
Statute.
In the past, the Court has occasionally disregarded formalistic
deficiencies, especially in the area of county and municipal administration.
Never taking the Legislature’s mandates lightly, the Court only did so so
when it first carefully reasoned that the particular statutory requirement
29
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was formalistic or superficial. The Court’s reasoning would always
address whether holding a party to the exact requirement, at the cost of
entirely invalidating an otherwise legitimate process, would respect the
substance of the statute.
In order to reach these decisions, the Court applied the principle
of substance over form. This principle is included in the Montana Code as
a “maxim of jurisprudence,” and it provides that “the law respects form
less than substance.”34 The code describes the purpose of these maxims is
to “aid in [the] just application” of the other provisions of the code.35
The Court applied the principle in two fairly recent cases where it
interpreted statutes regulating county administrative procedure and found
the alleged deficiencies insufficient to invalidate the overall process.36 In
Yurczyk, the Court upheld the validity of proposed zoning regulations
despite the lack of the word “resolution” in their title.37 The statute at issue
required the submission of a “resolution,” and the opposing party argued
that lack of that term in the title should void the regulations.38 The Court
held voiding the regulations for a mere wording oversight would be to
“elevate form over substance.”39 To reach its decision, the Court reasoned
that in substance the procedural requirements of the statute were met
because the critical mandate of the statute was not to title the document in
a certain way but to ensure that any proposed zoning regulations go before
the proper elected official before their adoption.40
Likewise, in McKirdy, the Court upheld the validity of a single
petition to transfer territory between two K–12 school districts despite the
lack of a second separate petition for the elementary school portion of the
territory transfer.41 The statute identified by the opposing party required
two petitions to effectuate a transfer between K–12 school districts, a high
school territory transfer petition accompanied by an elementary school
territory transfer petition.42 The opposing party argued that a reasonable
reading of the language, “accompanied by,” clearly indicates a
requirement of two physically separate petitions.43 The Court held that,
although the statute required one petition be accompanied by the other, it
would be overly formalistic to require two separate documents when one
petition clearly identifies the intent to transfer both high school and
elementary school territory.44 The Court reasoned that a second petition
34
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was nonessential to the substance of the statute because the single petition
contained all the requisite information that would have otherwise been
contained in the two petitions.45
In both of these cases, the Court balanced its duty to respect the
exact terms of a statute as Legislative mandate and its duty to respect form
less than substance. The rules of statutory construction accommodate this
balancing approach and illustrate the tension between form and substance
that the Court faced. The rule provides that “in the construction of a statute,
the office of the judge is simply to ascertain what is in terms or in
substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit
what has been inserted.”46 The rule gives courts permission to choose to
construe a statute based on its terms, its substance, or a combination of the
two.
In conducting its balancing in Mckirdy and Yurczyk, the Court
demonstrated that before it can diminish the importance of a particular
term, it must ascertain that doing so would not ignore the substance of the
statute, or in effect, omit some specific purpose that the legislature
intentionally inserted.47 Before coming to its conclusion in Yurczyk, the
Court determined that, in substance, the statute required that proposed
zoning regulations be reviewed by the board of country commissioners.48
Only by making that determination could the Court safely diminish the
importance of other aspects of the statute, like including the word
“resolution” in the title of the proposal. Otherwise, the Court was at risk
of using its power to override a legislative mandate placed in the code to
serve a legitimate policy purpose.
Likewise, in Mckirdy, the Court carefully established that the
central purpose of the statute was to ensure that local residents signing the
petition were aware that it implicated both elementary school and high
school territory.49 Only once it established the substance of the petition
requirement could the Court determine that to require two physical
documents would be formalistic and would not actually align with the
legislative mandate.50
Both of these cases demonstrate a carefully reasoned approach of
applying the principle of substance over form, and provide a useful
contrast to what the Court did here.
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B. In This Case, The Court Broadened its Ability to Excuse Statutory
Requirements under the Guise of Substance over Form, and it
Established That It Could Do So Without Satisfactory Explanation.
As discussed above, the Court has invoked the principle of
substance over form in circumstances where the parties did their best to
follow statutory requirements but failed to meet some unclear or
insignificant step. In those situations, the Court took time to explain why
the particular requirement did not serve the substance of the statute before
it determined that punishing the party for its misstep would not serve
justice.
In contrast, the Court here utilized substance over form as a catchall justification for excusing statutory deficiencies in a situation where it
wanted to produce a just result. The consequence of using substance over
form in this manner is that it justifies repetition of the overbroad use of the
principle in future controversies. In other words, it creates space for the
Court to disregard particular statutory deficiencies that stand in the way of
what the Court views as a just decision. Moreover, it allows the Court to
do so without explaining exactly why a certain provision is excusable or
insignificant to the statutory scheme and the Legislature’s policy goals.
To avoid this kind of overbroad use of substance over form, the
Court needed to address the significance of the county commissioner
approval requirement. Had it acknowledged, as Justice McKinnon did,
how county commissioner approval is important to a commissioner’s
obligations to their taxpayers and represents an important step in financing
the opening of schools, then the Court would have had to justify why that
requirement could be excused.
Rather, the Court offered no admission that the requirement has
significance, nor did it offer a satisfactory explanation for why the
requirement lacks significance. The Court’s only explanation is that
county commissioners have no direct supervision over schools.51 That
explanation is insufficient because it is not relevant to the tax policy
behind the requirement, which is to give elected officials an opportunity
to decide whether to increase taxes on their constituents. The Court
claimed that because “local school authorities” approved the school’s
opening, the substance of the statute’s requirements is met.52 This is also
an insufficient explanation because the local school authorities referred to
by the Court still lack the taxing power to actually raise the necessary
funds. Neither of these explanations amount to a convincing argument that
the requirement is formalistic, nor do they establish any criteria for when
such a requirement would be part of the substance of the statute. This
departure from what the Court did in McKirdy and Yurczyk, makes it that
51
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much easier for the Court to conclude that Legislative mandates are
satisfied, even when a plain reading of the statute would suggest otherwise.
By failing to engage in a meaningful discussion of why the
requirement was insignificant, the Court made it unclear what types of
statutory procedural requirements it will deem formalistic and unnecessary
in the future. The consequence of this lack of clarity is that school districts
or other local administrative bodies now can only guess what rules the
Court will enforce and what rules they can risk avoiding.

